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VOLUM XXXIII

FEBRUARY, 1927

NUMBER 2

UNIFORM LAW PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURTS
CONNOR HALL*

A great drive is being made for the passage of a bill
for investing the Supreme Court with power to prescribe

rules of procedure for law actions in the Federal Courts.
A committee of the American Bar Association, or perhaps
rather a small number of a committee, has been active in
propaganda work for the proposed legislation. Great
names have been invoked, and meetings of the Bar Association and lawyers have been passing resolutions in favor of
the bill, but the very unanimity with which some of these
resolutions have been passed confirms a natural belief that
the action was taken upon the initiative of a few active
persons, and without proper consideration. Such resolutions can not be accepted as truly representative. For one,
I have endeavored to follow this subject somewhat, and I do not
know, and have not heard advanced, a single sound reason
for this bill. Its sponsors say that it will promote uniformity,
simplicity, speedier decisions, and decisions upon the merits.
As to whether it will promote speed and decisions upon the
merits depends, of course, upon the second, that is, whether
it will promote simplicity. Any consideration of the subject may, therefore, be confined to the two arguments of
uniformity and simplicity.
Why should uniformity in the various District Courts of
the United States be held up as per se a desideratum? We
* Member of Cabell County Bar, Huntingon, West Virinia.
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should be shown in what way uniformity will promote justice. Unless it is to promote justice, then it is useless. The
sponsors of the bill, however, speak of uniformity as if it
were some excellence in itself, something transcendental
and absolute; or at least as an undoubted blessing, as
health, happiness or virtue. No reason is given why uniformity, if attained, would be of advantage to any litigant,
though it might be to some lawyers. For instance, a firm in
a great city may represent a railroad, or an industrial company doing business in many states. If the procedure in
the Federal Courts is uniform this city firm can, itself, conduct the main part of the litigation and reduce the local
lawyers substantially to filing clerks and advisors on jurors.
Uniformity, therefore, increases the influence and importance of the great city firm, having at its head, perhaps,
some business man masquerading as a lawyer, with his
partners of first and second magnitude, law clerks, process
servers, runners, etc.; would correspondingly reduce local
practice, local ability and local pride and drive the practice
of law further on the downward road from a profession
to a business. The hired man from the city supplants the
local lawyer who, indeed, may be "fogy" and wear baggy
breeches, but who, withal, is an independent thinker, has
leisure for reflection, is devoted to principles, and who more
than once has been found the mainstay of constitutional
liberty. Uniformity would further augment the importance
of large aggregations of men and depress the individual.
Its tendency is toward centralization and the further destruction of local character and influence.
.It is hard, however, to see how the new rules, as proposed
by their sponsors, would bring about uniformity. They
disclaim entirely the ordinary practice code which endeavors to cover the subject in detail, and say that the rules
would be reduced "to the last word in simplicity * * * * * ."
Then, if the rules are not to make provision for the various
contingencies of litigation, but are to be exceedingly simple,
questions would be continually arising before the District
Judge for which there was no rule.
We can not ignore the fact that questions, and numerous,
will arise. Suppose that in thetrial of an action a question does arise as to whether sufficient notice has been given
for the taking of depositions, whether the time were suf-
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ficient, whether they are properly certified, whether the
notices were sufficiently explicit, and no rule is found covering these points? How will the District .Judge decide?
By what will he be guided? The answer is not doubtful.
He will turn to the system in which he has been traineid
and with which he is already familiar, to-wit, the State
practice. During his years of practice and his contact with
other lawyers, a certain rule more or less well settled has
been followed. His mind will turn at once to that guide;
and to assert differently is to suppose that a man will rea-4on
otherwise than with his own ,mind, and out of his own
knowledge and experience. But the District Judge, having
in mind that a new system has been established, and that
he is presiding in an independent court, will follow the
State practice, not slavishly, but reasonably and equitably
-that is, "as near as may be." At the end of, say a generation, the practice would probably have reached about
the same conformity with State practice as is now observed.
The natural evolution would bring us back, after much
unnecessary toil, to the principle of the Act of 1789. The
friends of the proposed legislation argue from the wholly
false analogies of the equity rules and English practice.
The equity rules have been applied with fair uniformity.
But why? Because a detailed uniform equity procedure
had already been developed in England and in the Federal
Courts of this country, and whenever a question arises under new rules we turn back to the old practice for a guide.
The new rules, therefore, have not developed any uniform
procedure but have fallen back upon a practice that was
already uniform. In the same way, the various District
Courts, in the application of simple practice rules, would
fall back upon the old practice which they had learned,
to-wit, the State practice, and we would have again as many
differing procedures as there are states in the Union. The
argument drawn from the English practice is equally fallacious. England again is a small and compact country,
living under one law, and in the application of* its rules
every lawyer and every judge had the same guide in antecedent practice, and not as in the Union-forty-eight. I
have not yet heard that England has attempted to establish
uniform procedure for Kent and New South Wales, which
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would hardly be more absurd than for Rhode Island and
New Mexico.
As to simplicity, this is as President Wilson well said,
rather a matter of emphasis. The attempt to obtain entire
simplicity and lack of technicality through rules is a will-o'the-wisp. All sorts of questions will, and do, arise in the
course of litigation, and we can not avoid them by pretending that they do not exist. Many of these questions, perhaps, are not important, but some are important. Even
so, in hotly contested litigation the unimportant ones will
be pressed, and certainly the important ones are effective
in a very practical way upon the substantive right. It is
futile to pretend otherwise. If a group of mariners tired
of studying their complicated charts should decide to throw
them away and adopt more simple maps, they would not
thereby do away with the air and water currents through
which they must pass, or the icebergs or the reefs in their
course. Legislatures have, from time immemorial, enacted
statutes that causes should be decided according to the very
substance of the right without regard to technical defects.
At frequent intervals for almost a thousand years English
speaking countries have passed such statutes, and some of
our worthy brethren of the American Bar Association are
still busy upon them. The regularity in the reenactment
of this statute already upon the books is an apt illustration
of the work of reformers heedless of history. This is not
to elevate practice before, or even to anything approximating equality with the substantive right of the cause.
Practice is a mere tool, but in any system of government,
having anything like a guaranty of private. rights and a
judiciary of integrity and consistency, there must be a way
to bring causes to the attention of the court; to adduce
proof; to hear argument; to conclude the cause; to give
the proper judgment; to take the proper steps for enforcing it; to seize the property which, perhaps, really belongs
to the debtor 'and not to somebody else, yet at the same
time not permit him to hide what he really owns; to grant
certain exemptions for the relief or self respect of himself
and family and yet not permit these to be abused. Jack
Cade (or can it possibly be Jack Code?) thought all of
this was very easy and that lawyers were merely perverse,
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but any lawyer knows that it is difficult and often necessarily intricate and complicated. We cala -not ignore the importance of a settled and fair procedure. For instance,
suppose a defendant has a most righteous defense but an
essential witness fails to arrive but expects to appear within
a few days, how long should the court wait? The length
of time it waits is a matter of procedure, and yet to him,
at least, it means life or death. Manifestly, we would say
that the court should wait, but not too long, for, if continuances could be indefinitely granted for such reason, the
plaintiff who had just cause might, by the operation of the
rule, be deprived of an opportunity ever to recover upon his
cause. In this, and numerous other cases, the application
of rules must always be of considerable impoitance. The
public men of the States of the Union have been struggling
with these problems for many years. It would be a bold
man who would say that they were not many of them able,
conscientious and well informed, indeed, many of them
geniuses and learned sages. They had before them the
same evils, the same great problem of enforcing substantive rights and of adopting reasonable rules for the ascertainment of truth. Why should we, of the present, be so
impressed with our superior wisdom that we must regard
their labors as futile, throw their works into the discard
and begin all over again? It is easy to adopt slogans, to
utter wise platitudes and to enlarge upon the failures of
others, but the wise and experienced statesman usually
endeavors to retain and improve upon the work of others,
while the impractical Utopian decides to evolve a wholly
new system out of his head. Stability, even in procedure,
is highly desirable. It is a maxim that nothing is worse
than variable and uncertain law.
The present scheme seems to be typically American in
its faith in machinery. A great deal has been said about
the excellency of the administration of justice in England,
and it has been assumed that if we adopt something like
their rules of procedure we will enjoy the same excellence.
Why so? Do their rules of procedure constitute all? Such
an argument belies the position of its sponsors. English
justice comes, not out of its rules of procedure, but out of
the English character and the English judicial system. The
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English are homogeneous people with a generally diffused
sense of fairness and long training in self-government.
These are the things that make for justice. How feeble
to ignore all these and to speak as if a book of procedure
were the be all and the end all of the supreme and final
test of government, to-wit, the administration of right between man and man. The Judge in England, as I am told,
is my Lord on the Bench. He is selected from the leaders
of the bar; he is given an adequate salary and. a long tenure. Consequently a small police court shyster has not
much standing before him. Only able men make progress
in such courts, and lawyers upon both sides being skilled
and well trained do not consume days in immaterial wrangling, in pertinacious puny objections, but come to the merits
of the cause. A characteristic story is told of an English
Vice-Chancellor. The barrister was arguing before him
that the old law said a man should not beat his wife with
a rod thicker than the thumb, and that he impliedly had
the right to beat her with one of that thickness. The report 'said that the Vice-Chancellor did not answer the
argument. He merely smiled. That is the spirit with
which all petty points of law as well as of procedure should
be treated. We can never be rid of technicalities by devising new systems, and thus giving to each state in the
Union another system to be learned and argued about.
Much important work has recently been done in reducing
procedure to its proper place, but this has been accomplished by placing the emphasis upon substance and in regarding rules of procedure as instrumentalities for reaching
the right. And what has been done has resulted, not so
much from new rules and new systems as from the changed
attitude of judges. The majority report of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate, in speaking of Section 914 of the
Revised Statutes, says "With the passage of this statute began the confusion which, increasing as the years have gone
by, now makes the practice of law in the District Courts of
the United States the most difficult and uncertain of the
whole civilized world." It is submitted that there is no
warranty for this statement. The trial and decision of a
case in any particular District Court depends largely, as
it should, upon the judge.. If he is a competent lawyer
and has had adequate experience, the chances are that
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merely technical objections will be treated without much
ceremony. The Judge, it is true, listens respectfully, but
he usually finds a way to obviate the objection. Almost
any active lawyer knows one or more, perhaps a number,
of the District Courts where this is true. On the other
hand, where the incumbent was, before appointment, an
untrained pettifogger, engaged largely in justice of the
peace or police court cases, justice is well nigh impossible
with him, no matter what system of procedure is in vogue.
To such a man, every rule found in a law book is equally
law, equally crystallized, equally fixed and rigid. He does
not know what the present law is and does not know what
has become obsolete. Far fetched objections of every kind
are argued at length, taken under advisement, and as soon
as disposed of another similar objection is made, so that
it is almost impossible to reach a trial. Such a court is a
very paradise for bad causes and bad defenses. But it is
due to the ignorance of the Judge and not to the system of
the procedure unless, indeed, the procedure be that of the
detailed codes, and that, as experience has shown, is difficult even for a good Judge.
Some of the friends of the bill indulge in assertions which
can hardly be treated seriously. Thus we are told that the
rules to be framed by the Supreme Court will be the "last
word in simplicity." The bill, itself, nowhere says that the
rules shall be simple. Its language is that "the Supreme
Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe
by general rules for the District Courts of the United States
and for the courts of the District of Columbia the forms of
process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and
procedure in actions at law." Here we have it laid down
that the court shall prescribe rules, not only for process,
writs, pleadings and motions, but also for practice and procedure. These are very extensive words. There is no requirement that the rules shall be simple. The truth is that
simplicity is an afterthought brought forward as an argument in support of the bill. If the intention had been that
the rules be simple, it was very easy to insert the word. It
may be argued that it was the purpose of the American
Bar Association, of the Committees of Congress and of the
friends of the bill that the rules should be simple, but the
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courts usually look to the terms of an act to see what the
Legislative body means. And while committee reports may
be looked at to solve ambiguities, it will hardly be argued
that there is an ambiguity here. The court is given power
to prescribe general rules, and by this is doubtless meant
rules more or less complete and adequate to the exigencies
of litigation. Who is authorized to say what the Supreme
Court will do? The court is already greatly overburdened,
and the task in any form is too great for its leisure, if it had
special fitness. Much of the time of the Judges is consumed in strictly applying its own rules of procedure to
keep litigants out of the court. This may, indeed, be necessary because of its heavy duties; nevertheless, so it is.
The Supreme Court of the United States, while it has at
many times been composed of very able lawyers, has very
wisely handled many great problems and is not subject to
much of the criticism made against it, is, nevertheless, very
conservative. Its own practice, although much tinkered
with and reformed, has become almost a special art. Anyone at all familiar with its practice knows that it is very
difficult for a litigant to get into court, and if he gets in he
frequently finds himself out again upon a point of practice
which seemed strict to his counsel. Nevertheless, we are
told that this body is to produce a model of perfect ease
and simplicity. The Majority Report of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate avers that the new centaur "shall
embrace all the merits and none of the vices of 'common
law' and 'code' .pleading, and that it is neither." Truly
the millenium is at hand; awaiting only the advent of this
magnum opus innominatum et incognitum.
It is submitted that the proposed legislation is only one
of the various reforms with which this country has long
been plagued, which proposes to scrap the result of experience and to begin-all over again; to unsettle and to begin
again the costly process of resettlement.
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